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Abstract
The growth of digital information transmission worries copyright holders who fear
the new technology threatens their profits because of greater piracy and widespread
sharing of digital works. They have responded with proposals for expanded protection of
digital works. Specifically, they seek restrictions on personal use rights regarding digital
works provided by the fair use and first sale doctrines. The proposed changes in the
allocation of property rights to digital information significantly affect the ability of
copyright holders to practice price discrimination. Broader user rights make
discrimination more difficult; broader producer rights make discrimination easier. I argue
that more price discrimination not less piracy or sharing would be the really significant
effect of the proposed changes. The problem of digital piracy can probably be handled by
technical means with modest changes in copyright law. The so-called problem of sharing
is not really much of a problem except for price discriminators. On the other hand,
copyright expansion could significantly expand opportunities for price discrimination.
Curtailing personal use rights would make it easier for a price discriminator to measure
buyer valuations and stop buyers from arbitraging away price differences.
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INTRODUCTION
During the past twenty five years copyright holders have repeatedly preached the
coming of the Apocalypse as new technologies for copying and distributing works
became available.1 VCR spells doom for movie producers.2 Photocopiers will ruin
academic publishers.3 Digital audio tape means the end of the music industry.4 And so
on.5 These prophecies mobilized lawyers and lobbyists representing the publishing
industry to push for copyright expansion. They met resistance from representatives of
the consumer electronics industry, librarians, and other groups opposed to copyright
expansion. Sometimes concern about technological innovation moved the courts or

1

See Paul Goldstein, COPYRIGHT ’ S HIGHWAY 29 (1994).
See Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 ORE. L. R EV .19, 35 (1996).
3
See Goldstein supra note 1 at 78-128.
4
See Goldstein supra note 1 at 158 (“For record companies, the proliferation of unending generations of
flawless copies [on digital audiotape] spelled doom for the retail sales market.”) See Litman supra note 2 at
36.
5
See Litman supra note 2 at 22 (personal computers, VCRs and cable all stimulated debate about the
scope of copyright law); id. at 42, n. 93 (claim that audio and video tape would cripple and ultimately
destroy motion picture and television industries). A prime example of the flexing of the movie industry's
muscle is the delay of the introduction of Digital Versatile Discs (DVDs) into the U.S. marketplace due to
demands by the movie industry that DVD units incorporate strong copy protection. By threatening not to
release their products to DVD, the movie industry effectively held up introduction of DVD units for over a year.
See Junko Yoshida, Copy-protection questions delay digital roll-outs, E LECTRONIC ENGINEERING T IMES,
Feb. 3, 1997, at 1; Junko Yoshida, DVD: Last year's bang is now more a whimper, E LECTRONIC
ENGINEERING T IMES, Jan. 13, 1997, at 10. The flexibility of DVD as a delivery medium for the movie,
music, and software industries lead to the formation of a multi-industry Copyright Protection Technical
Working Group to decide upon standards for the new DVD decks to protect intellectual property distributed on
DVD discs. See Movie Companies, Drive Makers Agree on Copyright Protection, O PTICAL MEMORY
NEWS, Nov. 5, 1996, available on W ESTLAW , A LLNEWS database 1996 WL 8328542.
2
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Congress to expand copyright protection sometimes not.6 Nonetheless, technological
innovation consistently put copyright on the policy-making agenda and gave copyright
holders an occasion to argue for broader rights.
Copyright law is again convulsed by a new media technology, and copyright
holders have again issued a familiar warning: the Internet and digital information
transmission threaten the survival of many publishers.7 Text, software, music, and video
publishers and producers have united to lobby for legislation to expand copyright
protection of digital works. Copyright holders voice two main complaints about digital
technology: it promotes widespread unauthorized sharing of digital works between a
buyer and her8 friends and family; and it promotes piracy. Publishers prefer that each
user of a digital work purchase an original. Users often find it is convenient and
economical to purchase a single original and share it within their social group. Software
publishers are especially vocal about the effect of sharing on their profits; they claim to
have lost substantial profit to widespread sharing that results from unauthorized
copying.9 All publishers worry about pirates making cheap and precise digital copies and
easily transmitting the copies throughout the world via the Internet.10
Copyright advocates insist that it is good public policy to protect the profits of
the producers of digital works.11 First they argue that fairness requires that authors and
publishers should be able to keep their share of the copyright pie in the face of new
technologies. 12 This argument is usually cast in terms of the natural right of authors to
reap where they have sown. Second they argue that profits from copyrighted works
provide an essential incentive to produce and distribute those works.13 That incentive

6

See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (no infringement by
videotaping); Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., (no infringement by digital
audio taping); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994) (infringement by
photocopying); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F.Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(infringement by photocopying); Williams&Wilkins, Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, aff’d by an
equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1978) (per curiam) (no infringement by photocopying).
7
See Garry McDaniels, Copyright Protection on the Internet, Testimony before the House Jud. Subcomm.
on Courts and Intellectual Prop., Feb. 7, 1996, 1996 WL 7135497. Id. (“The easy reproduction of
computer software, and the far-flung messaging capabilities of the Internet, have shifted the legal balance far
away from copyright owners.”)
8
I will use masculine pronouns for copyright holders and feminine pronouns for users and competitors.
9
See Chuck Melvin, Pirates of the Cyber Age: Software Buccaneers are Thriving  and You May be One,
Too, T HE P LAIN DEALER, Jan. 20, 1997, at 5D. (In the software industry alone lost profits from unauthorized
copying are estimated to be $13 billion a year.); Litman supra note 2 at 30 (An estimated one-half of software
copies are unauthorized.) See infra text accompanying notes .
10
See infra text accompanying notes 31-39.
11
See, e.g., Jane Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information Superhighway”: Authors, Exploiters, and
Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 C OL . L. R EV . 1466, 1468 (user rights are secondary to the interests of
producers); Goldstein, supra note 1; Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: The
Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights (1995) [hereinafter White Paper].
12
See infra text accompanying note 48-49.
13
See infra text accompanying note 50-54.
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would be undercut by the increased sharing and piracy that is forecast to arrive with the
growth of the Internet.
The Clinton administration has come to the defense of copyright holders.14 A task
force headed by Patent and Trademark Office commissioner and former entertainment
industry lobbyist Bruce Lehman released a report known as The White Paper in 1995.15
The White Paper proposes a series of interpretations or modifications of copyright law to
increase protection for digital works. Notably, the White Paper defends recent cases that
limit the first sale16 and the fair use17 doctrines as applied to digital works. It also
supports the use of contract law to displace the fair use and first sale doctrines.18 In the
international realm U.S. diplomats have also pushed for broader intellectual property
protection for digital works.19
Internet service providers and digital equipment manufacturers join consumer
electronics firms and librarians in opposing expanded protection of digital works.20 The
first two groups are new to copyright policy-making disputes. They worry that stronger
copyright law will slow development of the Internet. In particular, they oppose indirect
copyright liability for service providers which is favored in the White Paper. 21 Generally,
the critics of copyright expansion favor broad dissemination of digital works.22 They
argue that the status quo provides adequate incentives to authors and publishers, and that
enlarged protection of digital works would come at the expense of unfairly diminished
public access to copyrighted material. Such access advances educational and free speech

14

See Litman supra note 2 at 21 (White Paper interprets copyright law in favor of copyright holders).
Supra note 10.
16
See infra Section I.C.1.
17
See infra Section I.C.2.
18
See infra Section I.C.3.
19
See Peter Jaszi Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 ORE. L. R EV . 299, 302 (1996). A treaty proposed by
delegates to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) would have included temporary
reproduction of a work within the reproduction right of a copyright holder. See 53 BNA ’ S P ATENT ,
C OPYRIGHT , & T RADEMARK JOURNAL 116 (1996). This proposal is directed at digital works that are
stored temporarily in a computer for use. See infra text accompanying note . The final treaty was
significantly modified to accommodate the wishes of users. See 53 BNA’s Patent, Trademark & Copyright
Journal 116 (1996). The proposed treaty also created an exclusive right of communication. But the final
version made it clear that telecommunication companies that merely provided a conduit for communication
did not infringe this right. See News From WIPO, http://www.hrrc.org/newswipo.html.
20
See 53 BNA’s Patent, Trademark & Copyright Journal 116 (1996) (WIPO proposal on temporary
reproduction was strongly opposed by the U.S. Internet industry).
21
See Ginsburg supra note 11 at 1492; Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, W IRED , Jan. 1996. In
contrast, the authors of the White Paper contend that it would be “premature to reduce liability of any type
of service providers currently in the NII environment.” White Paper, supra note 11 at 122. Since the hassle
of suing an individual customer may be too great, a small number of deep pocketed service companies is an
attractive target. The White Paper endorses cases that have found Internet service providers are liable under a
theory of contributory infringement for copying done by their clients. See Litman supra note 2 at 39.
22
See Litman, supra note 2; Samuelson, supra note 21; Julie Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A
Closer Look at Copyright Management in Cyberspace, 28 C ONN . L. R EV . 981 (1996). See also Neil W.
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Y ALE L. J. 283 (1996) (compares copyright
expansionists and minimalists in the digital context).
15
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goals as well as legitimate competition by firms who gain access to unprotected ideas
contained in protected works.23
Academics and policy-makers have debated the proper copyright response to
digital technology by assessing and balancing issues of profit and access, but they have
largely neglected what should be a key issue in the debate: price discrimination.24 I show
that the proposed changes in copyright law facilitate the practice of price discrimination
by sellers of digital works. The neglect of price discrimination is curious because raising
the issue could advance the position of either side in the debate. Proponents of copyright
expansion could argue that facilitating price discrimination is desirable because it restores
lost profit to publishers and (as an appealing bonus) it promotes economic efficiency.
Opponents could argue that price discrimination has undesirable effects on the
distribution of wealth and (contrary to usual claims) it subverts both access and economic
efficiency.
I have two goals in this Article: first, to show that the changes supported by the
White Paper will facilitate price discrimination; and second, to show that those changes
are not required to maintain the industry’s profit share. I present the arguments made by
supporters of copyright expansion in Section I. First I explain the claim that digital
technology threatens the profits of copyright holders because of increased unauthorized
sharing and piracy. I move next to the normative arguments stating that copyright
expansion is an appropriate response to falling profits. I conclude the Section by listing
the proposals for expanded copyright protection of digital works and explaining how they
might alleviate the problems of unauthorized sharing and piracy.
Section II covers the mechanics of price discrimination.25 My first task is to
explain how sellers price discriminate. Roughly speaking, price discrimination is a tactic
by which a seller charges a high price to high valuation users and a low price to low
valuation users. Effective price discrimination requires satisfaction of three conditions: (1)
the seller has market power; (2) the seller can sort customers according to their
preferences; and (3) customers cannot arbitrage away price differentials.26 In the absence
of market power a seller would find that competitors would be eager to serve his
disfavored customers and any price differential would collapse. The seller must have
information on consumer preferences or he will not know who to discriminate against.
Arbitrage means that favored customers can buy in order to resell to disfavored
23

See infra, note 254.
Some exceptions include Goldstein, Paul, Copyright’s Highway 8 (1994) (explains that copyright is
crucial for price discrimination by book and movie sellers); Netanel supra note 22 at footnotes 30 and 31
(digital technology promotes price discrimination); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s
Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND . L. R EV . 483 520-21 (1996); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and
Reality in Copyright Law, 94 M ICH L. R EV . 1197, 1205 (1996).
25
In Section III I explain how price discrimination operates in the market for digital works.
26
Sporadic price discrimination may occur under any market structure in response to changing economic
conditions and limited information. I am only considering persistent price discrimination.
24
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customers. The presence of arbitrage undermines price differentials. In most markets price
discrimination is either infeasible or feasible only to a limited degree since these
requirements are not fully met.
My other task in Section II is to show how copyright law affects price
discrimination. The exclusive rights granted to a copyright holder are a source of potential
market power that make price discrimination possible. Thanks to copyright there is a
single authorized producer of MS-DOS software. If Microsoft chooses to charge different
prices to different buyers of the same software, there are no competitors to woo the
disfavored customers. Copyright law also contains features that hinder price
discrimination. The first sale doctrine fosters indirect competition by allowing the first
buyer of a work to resell it. Resale is especially detrimental to price discrimination if a
low valuation user purchases a work at a low price and arbitrages by selling the work to a
high valuation user. The fair use doctrine is another deterrent to price discrimination. For
example, the fair use doctrine allows home recording of television programming. The
sharing of videotapes by friends and family works against price discrimination because it
makes it harder for sellers to sort customers into homogeneous groups. In contrast, the
fortunes of price discriminators may be bolstered by contract law. Resale and sharing of
works by users can be suppressed by contract terms.
The conditions allowing price discrimination are not satisfied in many markets for
copyrighted works. Even when the conditions are satisfied price discrimination does not
follow inevitably. If the cost of implementing price discrimination is too high, then
uniform prices prevail. Further, when sellers practice discrimination, the scope and
complexity of discrimination is limited by implementation costs. The law may facilitate
price discrimination by reducing implementation costs. Specifically, constriction of the
first sale and fair use doctrines and tolerance of contractual displacement of copyright law
reduces the measurement costs and makes arbitrage more difficult. Thus, expanding legal
protection of copyrighted digital works will likely increase the scope and complexity of
discriminatory pricing schemes.
Section III assesses the profit impact of unauthorized sharing, piracy, and price
discrimination. I argue that digital technology and the proposed changes in copyright law
work in a complementary fashion to significantly raise the profits from digital price
discrimination. Briefly, the primary effect of digital technology on price discrimination is
to make measurement easier. The primary effect of the legal changes is to make arbitrage
more difficult.27 Together this is a recipe for higher profits. On the other hand, I do not
see great losses associated with unauthorized sharing or piracy if copyright holders fail to
win their desired changes in the law. The effect of sharing is overstated because copyright
27

I argue that digital technology and expansion of copyright law will have a variety of effects on
measurement and arbitrage. In some ways digital technology makes arbitrage easier and in other ways
harder. Copyright law changes will make measurement easier in some cases as well as making arbitrage
harder. The details are covered in Section III. A.
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holders point to lost sales instead of the relevant measure of lost profits. Sharing has a
smaller effect on profit than sales, and it is not clear how much digital technology will
increase sharing for works other than software. Also both sharing and piracy probably
can be controlled by technology. To further combat piracy an appropriate regime of
copyright management could be implemented. A law that punished those who tamper
with copyright information attached to digital works would help control piracy but would
do nothing to facilitate price discrimination.
I. FEAR OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND DEMANDS FOR COPYRIGHT
EXPANSION
A. The Profit Threat from Piracy and Unauthorized Sharing
There are numerous activities that may infringe the exclusive rights of a copyright
holder, but in this Article I focus mostly on two that I call piracy and unauthorized
sharing. These are not terms defined by copyright law, rather they are terms I will use to
define economically relevant categories of behavior. I use piracy to describe the
unauthorized public distribution of literal copies of a copyrighted work, 28 and I use
unauthorized sharing to describe the unauthorized private distribution of literal copies of
a copyrighted work. 29 In economic terms, a pirate is a competing supplier of the
copyright holder, while parties engaged in sharing (whether authorized or not) should be
thought of as a coalition of buyers. As the boundary between public and private
distribution becomes blurred unauthorized sharing starts to look like piracy, and the
organizer of a coalition of buyers begins to look like a competing supplier.30 I will not
bother to fix a clear boundary between these categories, because most of the cases I
consider will clearly fall into one category or the other, and because it is not essential to
my main arguments.
28

Piracy should be distinguished from competition by a close substitute. Absent patent protection
competitors can learn ideas and imitate. See, e.g., Mark Lemley & David O’Brien, Encouraging Software
Reuse, 49 S TANFORD L. R EV . 255 (1997); Dan Burk, The Market for Digital Piracy, 214 (1997?) (piracy
and Internet distribution); Robert Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations 84 CALIF. L. R EV . 1293 (1996).
For the sake of brevity in this Article I only consider piracy of literal copies, but it sometimes
makes sense to include unauthorized public distribution of derivative works in the definition as well. Some
derivative works do not contain much added value. The public distribution of unauthorized translations of a
factual work or textbook or unauthorized anthologies might reasonably be treated as piracy. Cf. Basic
Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F.Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
29
A similar distinction is made by Litman supra note 2 at 41, and Richard Stallman, Reevaluating
Copyright: The Public Must Prevail, 75 O RE. L. R EV . 291, 294 (1996).
30
Record and software rental stores are an interesting case. One could argue that they are profit making
libraries, or that they represent a coalition of buyers who share a copyrighted work. It makes more sense to
consider them pirates because the public nature of their distribution makes them effective competitors to
authorized sellers of software or records. Such stores are precluded by Section 109 of the Copyright Act.
On the other hand, video rental stores flourish. What’s the difference? People usually rent a movie for a
single viewing and are less inclined to copy a movie. People usually use software and music repeatedly and
want their own copies. Further, the Macrovision copy prevention system is effective in stopping home
copying of rented videos. There is no equivalent system for software and records.
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Digital technology may expand the horizons of copyright piracy but it does not
change its nature. The traditional copyright pirate would obtain a copy of a novel, song,
or movie, and produce unauthorized copies of the work. She would then sell the bootleg
copies in competition with the authorized seller. Digital piracy amounts to the same thing
except the digital pirate might avail herself of the Internet for digital distribution of the
bootleg copies. An example of piracy on the Internet is provided by Sega Enters., Ltd. v.
MAPHIA.31 In that case the defendant made unauthorized copies of Sega games available
on a computer bulletin board where users could download the games for a fee.32 Besides
the profit seeking pirates that have always plagued publishers, the Internet creates a
genuine risk of piracy without profit.33 A disgruntled employee might distribute
proprietary software to get back at an employer, or a teenage hacker might decode and
freely distribute a game.34 The low cost of distributing copies on the Internet makes
mischievous or malicious piracy possible.
Copyright law must stop direct, unauthorized competition because it can wipe
out the profits of the copyright holder.35 A pirate distributing copies over the Internet
puts pressure on the copyright holder to cut his price. If the pirate can reach much of the
market for a work through the Internet, then the market price will plummet to the
marginal cost of storing and transmitting the digital work (a cost close to zero). Absent a
suitable lead time in marketing,36 the copyright holder will be unable to cover the fixed
costs of producing the original work.37 The disgruntled employee or teenage hacker might
be a more serious problem if they make the work freely available, putting even more
downward pressure on the price charged by the copyright holder. The problems of the
copyright holder are compounded by the possibility that third parties on the Internet
might speed distribution of unauthorized copies of a work by creating links, posting
information about the work, or actively redistributing the work themselves.38 The best
argument for expanding copyright protection of digital works builds on these fears.39
31

857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
Compare Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (Unlike MAPHIA the
defendant claimed he did not know the material was infringing) .
33
See Andrew Sorkin, Internet Song Use Spurs Recording Industry Suits, NEW YORK T IMES, D6, June 16,
1997 (most virtual bootleggers of music do it as a hobby); United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F.Supp. 535
(D. Mass. 1994) (bulletin board allowing people to get unauthorized copies of software at no charge).
34
Cf. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361;
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18173 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (The defendant made excerpts of letters available free of
charge for anyone to download or browse from his web page.)
35
See Litman supra note 2 at 42; Michael McCoy and Needham Boddie, Cybertheft: Will Copyright Law
Prevent Digital Tyranny on the Superhighway?, 30 W AKE F OREST L. R EV . 169 (Spring 1995).
36
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, HARV. L. R EV . (1971) (the lead time
advantage and strategic pricing are sufficient to give a publisher enough incentive to introduce a new work).
37
See Netanel supra note 22 at 292, footnote 27. Fixed costs include selecting, editing, typesetting, and
some one-time marketing and distribution costs. See Keith Aoki, Foreward: Innovation and the
Information Environment: Interrogating the Entrepreneur, 75 O RE. L. R EV . 1, 11 (1996).
32

38
39

Besides direct competitors, the copyright holder cares about other kinds of competitors. There are:
imitators, who may copy a work to extract ideas from the work that improve their ability to make and sell
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Sometimes the term piracy is used to cover what I call unauthorized sharing. For
example, the Software Publishers Association defines software piracy as unauthorized
copying of software.40 This definition includes both the mass marketing of unauthorized
spreadsheets and the unauthorized copy of a computer game that one friend gives to
another. I prefer a narrower definition of piracy to distinguish it from unauthorized
sharing because they are such different activities.
Sharing of copyrighted works is commonplace. Most buyers share any works
they purchase within their home. Buyers often lend novels, sheet music, and videotapes
to their friends. Parents teach songs, poems, and stories to their children. Magazine and
newspaper buyers photocopy or clip articles and give them to friends. Music, video, and
software buyers sometimes copy a work and give it away; they also lend a work knowing
it will be copied. Institutions likes businesses and schools buy reference books that are
shared by employees or students. These institutions also photocopy copyrighted works
and distribute the photocopies internally. Explicit authorization to share a copyrighted
work is not the norm. One important instance of authorization is a site license for
software that allows a purchaser to share access to the software with a specified number
of other users. 41 Most of the time sharing is either implicitly authorized or
unauthorized.42
Copyright holders complain that unauthorized sharing cuts their sales and hence
their profits, and that digital technology will make the problem worse.43 They claim that
unauthorized sharing will increase because new digital technology makes cheap and
faithful copying technology available to the masses.44 This argument is strongest with
regard to digital text. The appearance of the World Wide Web and other developments in
data transmission have created whole new markets for digital text. Until recently, most
text was available only in print, and digital technology was not very relevant to sharing
text because it is much easier to photocopy and share a printed work than to scan or
manually enter text into a digital file so that copies can be made and shared.45 Regarding
audio and video works, digital technology produces higher quality copies, but analogue
technology already produces reasonably good quality copies, so the copying technology
a similar product; creators of derivative or transformative works; and secondary market competitors, who
copy a work so that they can compete with the copyright holder in a secondary market related to the
copyrighted work, e.g., maintaining software. Expansion of the rights of copyright holders are also
designed to limit competition from these indirect competitors.
40
41

See infra note 139 and accompanying text
An explicit ban on sharing is becoming an important feature of software licensing agreements. See Mark
Lemley, Shrink-Wrap Licenses, 68 U. S. C. L. R EV .1239 (1995).
43
See McDaniels, supra note 7 (“One out of every five consumers recently surveyed admitted that they had
copied software from friends at work or school.” “...over $1 billion in business applications alone were
pirated in the United States in 1994 from all sources...”)
44
See Ginsburg supra note 11 at 1478; Netanel supra note 22 at 299.
45
Id. at 299-301.
42
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alone probably will not increase unauthorized sharing very much. The sharing of software
is intrinsically a feature of digital technology. Sharing software has been a common and
favored practice from the early days of computing.46
Besides better copying technology, better data transmission might also encourage
more unauthorized sharing. Local networks at schools and workplaces make it easier to
share software. E-mail makes it easier to share digital files of any type of work with
distant friends and family members. If consumers grow accustomed to purchasing digital
works over the Internet they might also get use to sharing them over the Internet.
B. Justification of Copyright Expansion
Proponents of copyright expansion advance two theories in support of their
position. The first is based on fairness and holds that the relative profit shares of the
groups affected by copyright law should not be altered by technological developments.
The second is based on economic efficiency and holds that incentives must be maintained
to produce copyrightable works.47
Copyright holders sometimes argue that they are entitled to their current share of
the surplus generated by the production and distribution of copyrighted works.48 This
argument derives from the view that legislation should be seen as an agreement among
affected parties about how to share the surplus from some regulated activity. The
entitlement claim can be supported by reference to the series of (perhaps hypothetical)
legislative bargains determining the content of the Copyright Act. The provisions of the
Act help determine the share of surplus that flows to copyright holders. They argue that
the Internet threatens to reduce their share and copyright law should respond to offset
that reduction. 49
The more common argument in support of copyright expansion is based on the
theory of public goods. 50 Copyrighted works like other kinds of information are classified
46

Cf. Stallman supra note 29 at 294
The expansion of copyright protection of digital works might have quite a different explanation. Instead
of a response to developments in digital technology, the expansion might simply be part of a general
expansion of copyright. The general expansion of copyright is explained by concerns about competitiveness
and property rights. Many policy-makers argue that expanded intellectual property rights subsidize hightech industries and promote economic growth. See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual
Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 V A. L. R EV . 149, 156-57 (1992). A complementary view
holds that the broadest possible property rights provide the best support for a competitive and efficient
economy. See Wendy J. Gordon, Assertive Modesty: An Economics of Intangibles, 94 COLUM . L. R EV .
2579 (1994); Goldstein, supra note 1 at 178-79.
48
See Litman supra note 2 at 25. Alternatively, copyright holders argue that according to a Lockean natural
rights theory they are entitled to as much of the surplus as they can appropriate with the help of the law. On
this view copyright should given copyright holders the broadest possible property rights. See Jaszi supra,
note 19 at 301-3.
49
See Edward Zajac, THE P OLITICAL ECONOMY OF F AIRNESS 121-123 (1995).
50
See generally Jean-Jacques Laffont, FUNDAMENTALS OF P UBLIC GOODS (1988).
47
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as public goods by economists. One characteristic of a public good is that the producer of
the good has difficulty charging others to use the good. In the absence of a copyright an
author would make little profit from his novel or other work because of the actions of free
riders. 51 Free-riders misappropriate a market created by the copyright holder. They take
a free-ride on the effort exerted by the author to create a work and the publisher to edit,
produce, and market the work. 52 Following the public goods theory copyright creates a
property right of sufficient duration and scope to provide an incentive to authors and
publishers to produce new works despite the looming threat of free riders.53 Effective
copyright protection thwarts unauthorized competition and preserves market power for
the copyright holder. During the term of the copyright free-riding is illegal. Once the
copyright expires and a work falls into the public domain then anyone can sell the
formerly copyrighted work.54
This incentive goal clashes with another goal of the copyright system: broad and
rapid dissemination of works.55 Perpetual and maximally broad copyright protection is
the surest way to provide incentives to produce and distribute new works, but such a
strong property right would impede dissemination. Strengthening copyright protection
increases the market power of the copyright holder which leads to supracompetitive
51

Even without copyright protection there are incentives to produce works of authorship. The first
publisher of a work will enjoy a lead time advantage over competitors that provides some profit. Some
kinds of works are protectible as trade secrets or by technology. Some works are funded on a contractual
basis.
52
See Aoki supra note 37 at 11.
53
Positive and negative effects arise in relation to productive incentives. An optimistic view is that price
discrimination raises profits and promotes additional investment in quality works of authorship. A
pessimistic view is that price discrimination generates profits that are dissipated via nonproductive rentseeking. Supporters of price discrimination by copyright holders argue that it will increase the incentive to
produce copyrighted works. A related but more subtle argument is that widespread price discrimination
would allow various authors and publishers to more nearly capture the full social value of copyrighted
works which would encourage a better allocation of productive effort to those works generating the highest
social value. See Goldstein, supra note 1 at 200, 217 (1994) (The broadest copyright assures that allow
authors get the largest possible share of the value they create. This eliminates distortions in investment
decisions among possible copyrightable works.) Skeptics argue that the increased profits from price
discrimination may cause too much investment in copyrighted works. Excessive investment might be
directed to particular entertainment projects like blockbuster movies or to duplicative factual like popular
software application programs. See Netanel, supra note 22 at 333-35; Lunney, supra note 24 at 655. Other
forms of unproductive rent-seeking include lobbying and litigation. See generally Richard Posner,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 260 (1986). (The efficiency effect of price discrimination is indeterminate.
Even perfect price discrimination might be inefficient because it creates bigger rents that may be offset by
wasteful rent-seeking.)
54
Instead of copyright the government could use prizes or other payments to support the production and
distribution of works of authorship. Such incentives are already used to a limited extent. The federal
government provides grants through organizations like the NSF, NIH, NEA, and NEH. Also universities
support authorship through salary and grants.
55
Non-rivalrous consumption is the second characteristic of public goods. See generally Laffont, supra note
50. This means that increasing the number of consumers of the good does not impair the utility derived
from consumption of the good by the original consumers. The significance of this characteristic is that the
efficient price of information is the cost of transmission which is close to zero. Thus, there is a tension
inherent in copyright between responding optimally to the free-rider and to non-rivalrous consumption.
Economists refer to this as a trade-off between dynamic and allocative efficiency.
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prices. High prices cut demand and restrict the dissemination of copyrighted works. An
optimal copyright policy must balance the incentive and dissemination goals by making
the right choices for scope and length.
With regard to the Internet, copyright holders argue that their productive incentive
should be increased by copyright expansion to offset the harmful effects of the new
technology on profits.56 A key implicit assumption in that argument is that the original
balance was close to optimal (or that the original incentive was too small) so Congress or
the courts should act to restore it.57
There are many objections to both of the theories that supporting copyright
expansion.58 In this article I will challenge them in detail on only one point. Both the
fairness and efficiency theories posit that digital technology will significantly cut profits
through unauthorized sharing and piracy unless copyright law is changed. I argue that
sharing and piracy will not be significantly greater in the digital world and the net effect of
new technology actually will be to increase the profits of publishers even without major
changes in copyright law.
C. Proposed Expansion of Copyright Protection of Digital Works
Sharing and piracy get different treatment from proponents of increased
protection of digital works. The piracy problem is addressed mostly through legal changes
that support more effective enforcement of existing rights. In contrast, the problem of
unauthorized sharing is addressed mostly by expanding the rights of copyright holders
and constricting the rights of users.
The difference in treatment is natural considering that piracy is squarely covered
by existing law,59 but unauthorized sharing is often exempted from copyright liability. For
example, the first sale doctrine permits a purchaser to share a magazine sequentially with
several friends.60 In addition, the fair use doctrine sometimes permits an educator to
photocopy a magazine article and share the copies with students in class.61 In contrast, if
a firm subscribes to a magazine and a manager at the firm photocopies the entire magazine
and distributes the copies to other managers then there is a copyright infringement.

56

They also argue the threat of widespread infringement justifies adoption of technical measures to control
and track copying. See infra text accompanying notes . See also Cohen supra note 22 at 984 (1996)
57
See Litman supra note 2 at 32 (hard to determine the right incentive).
58
For example: limits on copyright law foster the development of new media technologies, see Litman
supra note 2 at 27; there are other important incentives to produce works of authorship, id. at 28-29;
unauthorized sharing contributes to the dominant position of some types of software, id. at 30; and the
legislative bargain over copyright is not fair because no one bargains for the public, id. at 35.
59
Under the reproduction right ß106(1) and the distribution right ß106(3).
60
See infra text accompanying note 67-75.
61
See infra text accompanying note 81-95.
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Whether unauthorized sharing is characterized as infringement depends on the
treatment of personal copying and the scope of the personal use rights reserved to the
public. Personal use rights are not precisely defined in copyright law; they include reading,
listening, viewing, personal copying, private display, and transfer of a copy.62 The rights
may apply to home users, librarians and library patrons, and institutional users like
employees of a business, government, nonprofit organization or other institution. Some of
these uses are commercial and public, but none of the users engage in activities that make
them suppliers in competition with the copyright holder. Personal use rights derive from
the first sale doctrine (Section 109) and the fair use doctrine (Section 107) of copyright law.
Some argue that personal use rights might also arise from a restrictive reading of Section 106
which defines the exclusive rights of the copyright holder. One theory holds that personal
use amounts to a de minimus violation of Section 106 rights; another theory holds that
enforcement against home use comes at too high of a privacy cost.63
The area of personal use rights is ill-defined in copyright law because in the past
copyright holders rarely found it worthwhile to litigate small scale infringement of their
claimed rights. But the recent developments in media technologies have prompted
copyright holders to pay more attention to sharing.64 The general approach of proponents
of copyright expansion is to limit personal use to control sharing.65 Their proposals are
overbroad. The reader should note in the following description of the proposals that
many are directed at purely individual behavior that does not result in sharing.66

62

See Paul Goldstein 2 COPYRIGHT ß5.1 at 5:6 (2d ed. 1996).
See Netanel, supra note 22 at 299.
64
See Goldstein, supra note 1 at 130 (1994) Privacy concerns militate against copyright enforcement
against personal users, but “cheap, fast photocopies [and] new audio and video technologies have made
copying possible where it was impossible before, [as a result] the risk has grown that ‘private’ copies will
displace retail sales and rentals of the authorized originals from which publishers, record companies, and
motion picture producers earn their revenues.” Id. Private copying by video and audio tape has growing
economic importance. See Ginsburg, supra note 11 at 1478.
65
See America’s Libraries Call for Caution at the International Copyright Negotiations for the Digital
Age American Library Association Washington Office Newsline Volume 5, Number 86, December 9, 1996.
(“Before international copyright negotiations at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
began December 2, America's five major library associations urged U.S. delegates to reconsider their
positions and not to negotiate on issues on which there is no consensus.” “As drafted, the proposals
would inhibit browsing on the World Wide Web; significantly increase exposure of online service
providers--including libraries--to copyright infringement liability; restricting copying currently permitted by
law and impose liability on manufacturers of lawful machines that can be used for illegal copying (e.g.
personal computers and VCRs); potentially undermine the Fair Use doctrine and related exceptions created
by Congress in support of education and library activities and undermine the long standing U.S. tradition
of protect content, not facts.”)
66
Another reason that copyright holders would like to restrict personal use has to do with Internet service
providers. An action for indirect copyright infringement against an Internet service provider depends on a
finding of direct infringement by a customer of the provider. See Goldstein, supra note 62 at ß6.3.1.2 at
6:26-27. Expanding the scope of copyright vis à vis noncommercial users makes it easier to prove indirect
infringement. See generally Liang, Practising Law Institute, Intellectual Property and the National
Information Infrastructure, Patents, Copyright, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series,
Sept. 1995.
63
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1. The First Sale Doctrine
The first sale doctrine authorizes a purchaser to dispose of a copyrighted work by
resale, gift or lease.67 Conversely, the doctrine precludes a copyright holder from
restricting distribution of a work once it is sold.68 Some commentary suggests that the
first sale doctrine also protects private display and personal copying.69 It is limited by
statutes that restrict rental of software70 and sound recordings.71 In addition, the doctrine
can be skirted if the copyright holder leases a work instead of selling it.72
Two recent copyright amendments cut back on the first sale doctrine, but still
express a healthy regard for personal use rights. The record rental and the computer
software rental amendments of 1984 and 1990 succeeded in stopping the kind of retail
rental that exists for videotape. Section 109(b) bans commercial record and software
rental,73 but Congress exempted: most software transfers by nonprofit educational
institutions; and lending of records and software by nonprofit libraries for nonprofit
purposes.74 Furthermore, certain transfers within a for profit business might also be
exempt.75 Importantly, in these amendments Congress distinguished free-riding
competition by retailers from personal use. The piracy by the rental stores was stopped
but private sharing was not impeded.
Proponents of copyright expansion push for further limits on the first sale
doctrine that will obstruct sharing of digital works.76 They have an attractive case because
simply reading digital material requires making a transitory copy in a computer’s random
access memory.77 One court78 has held that such copying is infringement unless
67

The leading case on the first sale doctrine is Bobbs Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
17 U.S.C ß109(a) codifies the first sale doctrine.
69
See Litman, supra note 2 at 21 (private performance, display and resale have always been outside
copyright protection).
70
ß109(b)(1)(A) prohibits a buyer from renting software for profit.
71
ß109(b).
72
See Goldstein, supra note 62 at ß5.6.1 at 5:107. But see id. at ß5.5.2 at 5:103 (If an artist lends a work
to an institution for private display, the borrower is permitted to lend the work to an employee for private
display.)
73
See id. at ß5.6.1 at 5:122-123.
74
See id. at ß5.2.1 at 5:29.
75
See id. at ß5.6.1 at 5:122-123.
76
See Litman, supra note 2 at 24. (“Under one controversial view of the copyright statute, most of the
activity that takes place in individuals’ homes when they turn on their computers, cannot lawfully be
engaged in without the authorization of the copyright owner in the material they see, hear, read, listen to or
view.”)
77
See Netanel, supra note 22 at 301.
78
MAI v. Peak Systems and Bell Atl. Business Sys. v. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp. 1995 WL 836331 (N.D.
Cal. 1995). But see Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1361; 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18173 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“MAI did not address the question
raised in this case: whether possessors of computers are liable for incidental copies automatically made on
their computers using their software as part of a process initiated by a third party. Netcom correctly
distinguishes MAI on the ground that Netcom did not take any affirmative action that directly resulted in
copying plaintiffs' works other than by installing and maintaining a system whereby software automatically
forwards messages received from subscribers onto the Usenet, and temporarily stores copies on its system.
68

14

authorized by the copyright holder or statute.79 If this approach is followed it will drive a
wedge between the first sale doctrine as applied to digital works and the doctrine as
applied to other types of works. Under the first sale doctrine a consumer can lend a book,
painting, or analogue tape to a friend. When the friend reads the book, views the painting,
or listens to the analogue tape no copy of the work is created. If these media are
transformed to their digital counterpart, then when the friend reads, or views, or listens to
the digital work a copy of the work is always created. For example, a CD player
temporarily stores a copy of the digital music recorded on a CD in the memory buffer of
the player, and a computer makes a similar temporary copy of a program or data input
from a disk, CD-ROM or other source.80
2. The Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine excuses various copyright infringements in deference to
competing policy concerns.81 Section 107 establishes a balancing test that weighs the
interests of the copyright holder against the private interests of the infringer and the
general public interest in access to information. Many types of personal use are
sanctioned under the doctrine, for example: library photocopying for medical research;82
photocopying by individual scholars; 83 and videotaping of television broadcasts.84 In the
software context fair use arguably covers movement of a program from one machine to
another, modification of a program for the sake of compatibility, and archiving of
programs.85
Netcom's actions, to the extent that they created a copy of plaintiffs' works, are necessary to having a
working system for transmitting Usenet postings to and from the Internet. Unlike the defendants in MAI,
neither Netcom nor Klemesrud initiated the copying.” “There is no logical reason to draw a line around
Netcom and Klemesrud and say that they are uniquely responsible for distributing Erlich's messages.
Netcom is not even the first link in the chain of distribution--Erlich had no direct relationship with Netcom
but dealt solely with Klemesrud's BBS, which used Netcom to gain its Internet access. Every Usenet server
has a role in the distribution...”) and Triad Sys. v. Southeastern Express Co., 1994 WL 446049 (N.D.
Cal. 1994).
79
Statutory authorization is found in ß107. See Goldstein, supra note 62 at ß5.6.1 at 5:124 (Section 117
allows a purchaser to reproduce copies as “an essential step in the utilization of the computer program.”)
80
See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Issues Raised by the National Information Infrastructure,
Practising Law Institute, 45, 51 Sept. 1996 (Digital Future Coalition seeks to amend Section 109 to assure
that an owner can transfer a copy of a digital work as long as the original is deleted at substantially the
same time); Netanel, supra note 22 at 371.
81
17 U.S.C ß107 codifies the fair use doctrine. It provides an affirmative defense against a copyright
infringement action. Fair use is made out by establishing the use is equitable on balance in light of the
following four factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including its commercial nature; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the proportion that was taken; and (4) the effect of the copying on the
market.
82
See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d 420 U.S. 376 (1975);
Goldstein, supra note 1 at 85, 120 (1994) (library photocopying arguably had become a custom that
should be accorded fair use treatment by the time of Williams & Wilkins).
83
See Goldstein, supra note 1 at 85 (1994) (publishers and libraries reached an agreement allowing libraries
to make photocopies for scholars).
84
See Ginsburg supra note 11 at 1479; Goldstein, supra note 1 at 158 (1994) Consumers use VCRs to
time shift and create a library. Id.
85
In addition to fair use, the provisions of Section 117 offer safe harbors for personal uses of software.
Section 117 limits the reproduction and derivative rights of a software copyright holder. It allows the owner
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The fair use doctrine may be constricted in the digital world. A photocopying
case, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco,86 offers a line of analysis that could easily
be applied to digital copying. The defendants were research scientists working for Texaco.
They made photocopies of journal articles from journals purchased by Texaco and held in
the company library. Texaco expected that personal photocopying by researchers would
be deemed a fair use even though it was in a corporate setting. A decisive factor
influencing the court to deny fair use was the recent establishment of the Copyright
Clearance Center (CCC); an organization developed to collect license fees for
photocopying.87 The court said that the creation of the CCC created a market for
photocopy licensing.88 A fair use ruling would deprive publishers of revenue from this
new market. The case has been construed to support the position that as transactions
costs fall the scope of the fair use defense should shrink.89 Applied to a future Internet
with digital commerce this development portends a much smaller role for fair use.90 The
Internet might feature electronic libraries of text, images, video, and sound that is
accessible at posted prices for portions as well as complete works. A portion could be
taken and paid for with a few clicks of a mouse. Since the transaction cost involved in
excerpting from protected works will be small, the fair use defense will fail.91 A harbinger
of this new regime is the creation of the Authors’ Union which is a copyright licensing
cooperative modeled after ASCAP and BMI.92 It was created to improve enforcement of
copyright for digital versions of textual material. Digital technology will also increase the
demand for copies of excerpts of protected works. This is especially true for multimedia
authors who might borrow small excerpts of audio and visual as well as textual material.93

of a copyrighted program to make a copy as an “essential step in the utilization” of a program and to make
back-up copies. See Goldstein, supra note 62 at ß5.2.1 at 5:32-33 (Section 117 can be read to authorize a
single corporate owner to allow many employees using a network to make copies for their networked
machines. Courts generally have not followed this reading.) Section 117 also gives a software owner the
right to alter a program so that it will run on her machine. Id. at ß5.4.3 at 5:91.
86
37 F.3d 881 (2nd Cir. 1994).
87
Id. at 896-897. Document delivery services are another new alternative. Id.
88
Id. at 898.
89
See Ginsburg supra note 11 at 1478; Jaszi supra note 19 at 301-2. See generally, Wendy Gordon, Fair
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,
82 C OLUM . L. REV. 1600 (1982).
90
See Goldstein, supra note 1 at 218-19 (1994) (Copyright holders can develop licensing schemes to
reduce transaction costs. Creating a fair use right undercuts the incentives for the appropriate institutions to
develop.)
91
In an amended opinion the court softened its analysis by affirming that photocopying for personal use is
still non-infringing. Amer. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913 (2d. Cir. 1994).
92
The market for music licenses is largely controlled by BMI and ASCAP. They license bars, restaurants,
radio and television stations and others to perform copyrighted music. The standard license gives blanket
permission to perform any music covered by BMI’s or ASCAP’s portfolio of copyrights. The charge for a
license depends on factors like the size of a bar or restaurant or the population served by the media station.
These factors can be verified by BMI and ASCAP and are positively correlated to buyers’ valuations. See
generally Merges, supra note 28.
93
See generally Alfred Yen, Entrepreneurship, Copyright and Personal Home Pages, 75 O RE. L. R EV .
331 (1996) (Web pages creators often take unauthorized excerpts from other Web pages).
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A greater demand for excerpts helps to cover the fixed transactions costs involved in
licensing such users. 94
The fair use doctrine plays a major role in promoting or deterring unauthorized
sharing. In some cases copying that leads to sharing is excused and in others it is not. In
Sony v. Universal Studios the Supreme Court exempted from copyright liability the act of
making videotapes of TV programs that could be shared with family and friends. In two
photocopying cases opposite results were reached. In U.S. v. Williams & Wilkins the
Court exempted photocopying by a government library to increase the effective
circulation of its journals, but in Texaco photocopying by a corporate library for the same
purpose was not allowed. If the reasoning in the more recent Texaco is followed then
personal copying for sharing and for strictly individual purposes95 will lose much of its
protection under fair use.
Fair use also has an impact on piracy. Copyright expansionists would like to impose
liability for browsing unauthorized material in order to chill the market for pirates. Many
commentators have expressed concern that reading, viewing and listening to digital works
implicates the copyright holder’s exclusive right to make reproductions under Section
106(1).96 The issue arises in the context of the World-Wide-Web because a user browsing
a Web page makes a temporary copy of the digital information she encounters on the Web
page in her machine’s screen memory.97 MAI Systems Corp.. v. Peak Computer, Inc. 98
holds that such a copy is fixed and therefore appropriate subject matter for copyright
protection.99 Thus browsing becomes infringement unless it is authorized. Now this may
not be a problem since the posting of material on a Web page invites browsing and
amounts to implicit authorization to browse. But a problem does arise if the Web page
contains unauthorized copies of digital works, and many Web pages contain unauthorized
text, photos, and software. In those cases the creator of the Web page cannot authorize
browsing.
Copyright expansionists believe that temporary copies should be treated like
other copies. 100 Personal use defenders would reverse the holding in MAI Systems so that
94

The Digital Future Coalition wants to amend the Copyright Act to make it clear that the fair use defense
still applies in a digital environment. See Samuelson, supra note 80 at 51.
95
Sharing is only one aspect of personal use. Modification, archiving, choice of field of use, browsing, and
the creation of derivative works for personal use are also covered by personal use rights and also impinged
by proposals for digital copyright expansion. The justification for cutting protection of individual acts is not
to stop sharing. It is consistent with the purpose of promoting price discrimination.
96
See Litman, supra note 2 at 45.
97
Exclusive rights over temporary reproductions would cover browsing the Internet, caching data during
the operation of a telecommunications network, and copying to memory buffers in a CD audio player. See
News From WIPO, http://www.hrrc.org/newswipo.html.
98
991 F.2d 511; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 7522 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Peak's loading of copyrighted software
into RAM creates a "copy" of that software in violation of the Copyright Act.”)
99
See Aoki supra note 37 at 12.
100
See Ginsburg, supra note 11 at 1476-79.

17

temporary copies are not infringing.101 Alternatively, they support broad protection of
temporary copying under fair use. Dicta in an infringement action against an Internet
service provider makes the argument that browsing is fair use even when the reader
browses unauthorized copies.102
The temporary copying involved in browsing is only necessary because humans
cannot otherwise perceive digital information. It is the functional equivalent of
reading, which does not implicate the copyright laws and may be done by anyone
in a library without the permission of the copyright owner. However, it can be
argued that the effects of digital browsing are different because millions can
browse a single copy of a work in cyberspace, while only one can read a library's
copy at a time. Absent a commercial or profit-depriving use, digital browsing is
probably a fair use; there could hardly be a market for licensing the temporary
copying of digital works onto computer screens to allow browsing. Unless such a
use is commercial, such as where someone reads a copyrighted work online and
therefore decides not to purchase a copy from the copyright owner, fair use is
likely.103
3. The Copyright and Contract Law Intersection
Some commentators believe that copyright law is becoming irrelevant to digital
104
works. The reason is that many digital publishers contract around the first sale and fair
use doctrines. The practice is common for mass marketed software.105 Software
companies insist that they license rather than sell their products106 -- because of the
shrink-wrap packaging of the software these licenses are known as shrink-wrap licenses.
Restrictive licenses that abrogate personal use rights are also negotiated in arms length
transactions. License terms may preclude a buyer from doing the following to her
software: transferring, sublicensing, leasing, copying, modifying, migrating, translating,
disassembling, decompiling or converting to another programming language.107 Some of
101

See Samuelson, supra note 80 at 51 (Digital Future Coalition sought amendments to Section 106 that
protect temporary copies made incident to an otherwise lawful use).
102
See Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361; 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18173 (N.D. Cal. 1995) n. 25 (“Additionally, unless a user has reason to
know, such as from the title of a message, that the message contains copyrighted materials, the browser
will be protected by the innocent infringer doctrine, which allows the court to award no damages in
appropriate circumstances. In any event, users should hardly worry about a finding of direct infringement; it
seems highly unlikely from a practical matter that a copyright owner could prove such infringement or
would want to sue such an individual.”)
103
Id.
104
See Lemley, supra note 42 at 1239.
105
See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, x (7th Cir. 1996) (“Every box containing its
consumer product declares that the software comes with restrictions stated in an enclosed license. This
license, which is encoded on the CD-ROM disks as well as printed in the manual, and which appears on a
user's screen every time the software runs, limits use of the application program and listings to noncommercial purposes.”)
106
See Lemley, supra note 42 at 1244 (Microsoft licenses all software it does not sell any of its software to
defeat the first sale doctrine).
107
See id. at 1246-47.

18

these terms are designed to block software sharing or discourage piracy, but other terms
appear designed to control strictly individual uses.108
The legal foundation for copyright license restrictions is not completely secure.
The chief issue is whether and to what extent federal copyright law preempts licenses
effectuated through state contract law. 109 The limited case law has been mostly hostile to
the enforcement of shrink-wrap license terms.110 They have been voided on grounds of
preemption and also because of failure of mutual assent or based on a policy against
adhesion contracts.111 In contrast, courts have generally enforced contract terms that do
not constrict personal use rights.112
Despite the possibility of contractual limits on personal use, digital publishers
have reason to push for expanded copyright protection. The advantage of copyright law
is that it provides more generous remedies than contract law. A successful copyright
plaintiff routinely gets injunctive relief (often including a preliminary injunction). There
are also statutory damages, and for willful infringement, treble damages and attorneys’
fees.113
4. Enforcement Issues
The authors of the White Paper and other supporters of copyright expansion
advocate three measures to improve enforcement of the copyright on digital works: allow
indirect copyright liability to be imposed on Internet service providers; 114 prohibit
technology designed to defeat copy prevention techniques;115 and outlaw tampering with
108

License terms work against piracy and sharing by limiting access and by stopping software
modifications designed to thwart copy prevention. Copy prevention is discussed infra notes x and
accompanying text. Terms that abrogate the first sale doctrine obviously restrict sharing. Except
transferring, sublicensing, and leasing, the other restrictive terms might affect purely individual use of a
work. The terms governing disassembling, decompiling, and modifying are especially troubling because
they might contribute to entry barriers blocking legitimate competition. See generally Julie E. Cohen,
Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual Property Implications of “LockOut” Programs, 68 U. S. C. L. R EV . 1091 (1995).
109
Statutory preemption requires: (1) the state right be equivalent to one of the rights listed in Section 106;
(2) the right must cover a work that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression; and (3) the work must
come within the subject matter definition of copyright. See Goldstein, supra note 62 at ß15.2 at 15:5.
110
See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (Provision in license preventing
decompilation or disassembly is unenforceable.); Lemley, supra note 42 at 1248-59. But see ProCD, Inc.
v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); White Paper, supra note 11 at 58-59.
111
See Lemley, supra note 42 at 150-52, 55-59. Specific terms have been voided on the grounds of
unconscionability. Id. at 1154.
112
See Goldstein, supra note 62 at ß15.2.1.2 at 15:11 (Contract law is generally immune from
preemption.). But see Netanel, supra note 22 at 306 (First Amendment limits and copyright preemption
may apply to database access contracts); Lemley, supra note 42 at 1273-74 (Copyright holders should not
be allowed to enjoy both copyright advantages and contract law benefits or should they be forced to choose
as is the case with patents and trade secrets.)
113
See Lemley, supra note 42 at 1273.
114
See Ginsburg supra note 11 at 1492-4.
115
See McDaniels, supra note 7 at x (H.R. 2441 prohibits “black boxes” that are used to circumvent
technical protection for computer programs. H.R. 2441 would prohibit goods and services with the primary
purpose or effect of circumventing technical means of preventing or inhibiting copyright infringement.)
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copyright management information.116 There are a few cases yielding mixed results on the
question of indirect copyright liability of Internet service providers. 117 Copyright holders
hope they can use indirect liability to find deep pockets to cover losses from piracy and
sharing.118 In addition, imposing liability for unauthorized sharing complements the
policy of indirect liability. Indirect infringement is predicated on the occurrence of direct
infringement. Copyright holders will have a much easier time enforcing their rights against
a few large Internet service providers than against the thousands or millions of small scale
infringers.119
The other two measures have been considered by Congress. Copy prevention
techniques use software and sometimes special hardware or media to stop copying. 120
These methods are quite effective in stopping copying for the purpose of sharing. They
have been less effective in stopping piracy. One reason is that technological
countermeasures can usually be developed to circumvent the copy prevention technique.
Copyright management information is used to track the disposition of copyrighted works
once they leave the possession of the copyright holder.121 The information is valuable as
evidence of infringement and can be used to combat piracy.
II. FACILITATING PRICE DISCRIMINATION
A. Price Discrimination Fundamentals
Economists have analyzed numerous sophisticated marketing strategies. At the
core, many turn out to be types of price discrimination. Price discrimination means that
consumers of an identical product are charged different prices by the same seller, or that
consumers of similar products made by the same seller are charged a price differential

116

See id. at x (H.R. 2441 prohibits removal or alteration of copyright management information.)
See, e.g., Playboy Enterp., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F.Supp. 1552 (1993) (direct infringement by service
provider); Sega Enterp. Ltd v. MAPHIA, 857 F.Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (indirect liability); Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communic. Services, 907 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (no
indirect liability).
118
See McDaniels, supra note 7 (“[The Software Publishers Association] relies on current copyright law -including liability for indirect infringement -- to protect hundreds of software companies from piracy...”)
119
Besides any direct benefit to copyright holders from contributory infringement suits, the threat of
liability might help copyright holders in their broader contest with Internet service providers. These are the
two industry groups that will most profit from the rise of the Internet. Contributory infringement might
becoming a bargaining chip in a political deal concerning property rights on the Internet. The threat of
lawsuit might also be used to induce service providers to monitor users’ to detect and prevent copyright
infringement. See Ginsburg supra note 11 at 1488; Why Internet service providers should be copyright
guardians, Software Law Bulletin, May 1996 at 78. See generally Goldstein, supra, note 62 at ß6.3.1.1 at
6:25-26. The White Paper states that the service providers are in “the best position to know the identity
and activities of their subscribers and to stop unlawful activities.” See White Paper, supra note 11 at 112.
However, the service providers claim that they would have difficulty identifying infringing material. Id. at
115-6.
120
See notes 172-212 and accompanying text.
121
See notes 223-35 and accompanying text
117
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unrelated to cost. 122 The advantage of price discrimination to the seller compared to a
uniform sale price is that more revenue is generated.123 In the ideal case of perfect price
discrimination every customer is charged her maximum willingness to pay for the items
she purchased.
The issue of price discrimination was prominent in ProCD v Zeidenberg.124
ProCD manufactured and sold CD ROM telephone directories. The defendant Zeidenberg
violated a condition in his license that limited him to consumer uses. He copied the
directories and used them to make his own product that he marketed in competition with
ProCD. In his opinion, Judge Easterbrook explained how ProCD discriminated:
The database in SelectPhoneTM ... is much more valuable to some users than to
others. The combination of names, addresses, and [SIC] codes enables
manufacturers to compile lists of potential customers. ... People with nothing to
sell could use the database as a substitute for calling long distance information, or
as a way to look up old friends who have moved to unknown towns, or just as
[an] electronic substitute for the local phone book. ProCD decided to engage in
price discrimination, selling its database to the general public for personal use at a
low price (approximately $150 for the set of five discs) while selling information
to the trade for a higher price. It has adopted some intermediate strategies too:
access to the SelectPhoneTM database is available via the America On- line
service for the price America Online charges to its clients (approximately $3 per
hour), but this service has been tailored to be useful only to the general public.125
Effective price condition requires: (1) measurement of consumer preferences; (2) a
means to stop arbitrage by favored consumers; and (3) market power. 126 Are the
conditions for price discrimination met in ProCD? The passage above illustrates how the
seller measures preferences. Buyers are segmented into commercial and consumer
categories. Judge Easterbrook explains that commercial buyers have higher valuations.
Elsewhere in the opinion he explains that a term in the software license precludes
consumer buyers from making commercial use of the product. Such a term limits arbitrage.
One can only speculate about whether ProCD has sufficient market power to
successfully discriminate. Judge Easterbrook comments that ProCD has rivals. Market
power declines as the number of rivals increases.127 But a firm does not have to be a
122

ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, x (7th Cir. 1996) (“A producer of movies segments the
market by time, releasing first to theaters, then to pay- per-view services, next to the videotape and laserdisc market, and finally to cable and commercial tv.”)
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Speaking of price discrimination an antitrust casebook says “[t]here is no more profitable way to sell a
product.” Milton Handler, Robert Pitofsky, Harvey Goldschmid, and Diane Wood, TRADE R EGULATION:
C ASES AND MATERIALS 1221 (1996).
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86 F.3d 1447, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Id. at 1162.
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See generally Jean Tirole, THE T HEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988).
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Id. Generally, publishers will have rivals selling related but not equivalent works. In economic jargon
publishers usually operate in differentiated product markets. Id. Product differentiation gives some measure

21

monopolist to price discriminate. Some measure of market power is provided by the
copyright which protects the search engine used in the software and the high fixed cost of
selecting and maintaining the database. Time will tell. If the discriminatory pricing
persists that suggests sufficient market power.
Missing from the list of conditions is any mention of compliance with antitrust
law. Price discrimination is not effectively regulated. The Robinson-Patman Act outlaws
price discrimination in certain cases, but “it will not apply to just those cases in which
systematic price discrimination is most likely to exist and to have potent economic
effects.”128 Three important limitations are: it applies only to physical commodities;129 it
applies to sales but not leases;130 and it does not cover discrimination involving quality
variations.131 The few antitrust cases involving intellectual property and price
discrimination do not have much bite.132
B. Preference Measurement
Sellers have devised ingenious methods of measuring buyers’ valuations. They
must be ingenious because most buyers hide their valuations. In a negotiated transaction
the seller can observe general demographic characteristics but cannot force a prospective
buyer to divulge her valuation any more than the buyer could force the seller to divulge
his cost. In anonymous mass market transactions the seller does not even observe the age
or gender of the buyer. Sellers use what information they can glean from buyers to
support inferences about valuations. When inferences are weak and the cost of gathering
information is too high then price discrimination may not be worth the bother.
Economists use a three way classification scheme for price discrimination
depending on how preferences are measured.133 In third degree price discrimination price
differentials are tied to a characteristic of a buyer that is correlated with the buyer’s
valuation. An example is a senior citizen who gets a discounted movie ticket.134 The seller
observes the characteristic and infers that on average this type of buyer has a lower
valuation. In second degree price discrimination price differentials are tied to actions

of market power and may be sufficient to support price discrimination. There are two factors that may limit
the market power of digital publishers, and thereby limit price discrimination. First, digital technology
may encourage entry into the publishing industry. Second, the profits from broader price discrimination
may also encourage entry.
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Handler et al. supra note 123 at 1222.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1229.
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In BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), the Court allowed BMI to discriminate in the blanket licensing of
musical compositions. Discrimination was implemented by charging a royalty that varied with a buyer’s
revenues. See Herbert Hovenkamp, ECONOMICS AND F EDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 123 (1985).
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See, e.g., Tirole, supra note 126 at 133-52.
134
See id. at 73 (discusses price discrimination over time using examples of first versus second run movies
and hard cover versus paperback books).
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chosen by the buyer. The seller believes that certain actions reflect the preferences of a
low valuation buyer and other actions reflect the preferences of a high valuation buyer.135
In the movie example a Tuesday night discount illustrates second degree price
discrimination. In first degree price discrimination the seller knows or learns the exact
valuation of all buyers. This of course is an idealized benchmark.
The distinction between second and third degree discrimination is important
because second degree discrimination is usually more costly to implement. The greater
cost arises from the need to get buyers to sort themselves in a manner that makes
discrimination possible. Economists call this a sorting condition.136 The price and
characteristics of the good intended for the bottom end of the market must not attract the
high end, and the price and characteristics of the good intended for the high end must not
attract the low end. The sorting condition imposes an implicit cost on the seller because it
restricts the freedom of the seller to set efficient prices. With third degree price
discrimination the seller can choose prices for the two classes of consumers
independently. With second degree price discrimination the prices are linked. Economic
theory shows that a monopoly seller should set the efficient price for the high valuation
consumers and an inefficient price for the low valuation consumers.137 This inefficiency
yields the implicit cost of sorting. 138
Second degree price discrimination is common in the software market. A simple
method is to grant a site license.139 A site license authorizes a customer to install a certain
number of copies of software on stand alone machines at a site, or allow a certain number
of networked users to access the software on a server. By making licensing fees sensitive
to the number of users at a site the seller can profitably discriminate as long as the number
of users has a positive correlation to value.
Software publishers also use product design to facilitate second degree price
discrimination. Educational versions of software may sell for a fraction of the price of
standard versions. Sellers disable some of the features in the standard version so the
quality is reduced. A similar strategy is to include documentation and customer support
with the standard version and not with the educational version. Buyers who prize quality
must pay more for the standard version, and students who are less sensitive to quality
buy the cheaper version. Sorting will not occur unless the discount is large enough to
justify the quality reduction to the low valuation buyers. But the discount cannot be too
large or both types of buyers will purchase the cheap version.
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Easterbrook gives an example in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1162
(7th Cir. 1996): “An air carrier sells tickets for less to vacationers than to business travelers, using advance
purchase and Saturday-night-stay requirements to distinguish the categories.”
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If it is feasible to check student IDs before selling a cheap version then third
degree price discrimination is possible. Comparing optimal second and third degree
discrimination: both lead to the same price for the expensive version, while third degree
price discrimination leads to a lower price on the cheap version and higher profits to the
seller. The important intuition behind the economic theory is that the sorting condition
reduces the seller’s freedom and less freedom means lower profit. This discussion shows
that sellers prefer third degree discrimination. But in many markets sellers are forced to
rely on second degree discrimination because they cannot condition sales terms on
directly relevant buyer characteristics.
A more sophisticated version of second degree price discrimination requires
metering. In some cases metering can approximate first degree price discrimination. A
classic example is provided in the antitrust case Int’l Business Machines v. United
States.140 IBM tied the sales of its tabulator machines to purchases of punch cards that
were used in the machines. The likely purpose of this tied sale was to implement price
discrimination.141 Discrimination was accomplished by charging a relatively low price for
the tabulators, and a price above the competitive price for the punch cards. The purchase
of punch cards meters (or measures) the frequency of use of the tabulator. The effect of
the tied sale is to charge a high price to those who use the machine frequently and a low
price to infrequent users. IBM reasonably believed that frequent use was positively
correlated with high valuation.
Suppliers can sometimes directly meter the use of their product. Photocopy
machines have counters that record the number of copies that have been made. Lease
agreements often charge rates that depend directly on measured usage.142 Digital
technology will expand the use of direct metering.143 For example, rather than selling hard
copies of encyclopedias at a fixed price, a digital publisher could offer access to a digital
encyclopedia and charge based on usage. Frequent users pay more for access and
infrequent users pay less. As long as use is linked to value, metering can implement price
discrimination.144
C. Arbitrage
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at 233-36.
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Arbitrage is limited by many factors;145 I concentrate on the role of transaction
costs, technology, and law because they are especially relevant to digital works. Even
though arbitrage is feasible sometimes it does not happen because the transaction costs
are too high. In the movie example, even if the ticket taker is not very vigilant arbitrage
would be limited by the hassle of setting up a secondary market in movie tickets. Further,
theaters would resist arbitrage by limiting ticket sales to a small number per customer. In
a digital world where it may be possible to buy individual songs or newspaper articles or
photographs for pennies, small scale arbitrage might be too costly and large scale
arbitrage146 too easily detected to be feasible.
When quality differentials are the source of price discrimination arbitrage may be
blocked by technology. As described above, educational discounts accompany software
that has limited features compared to the higher priced version. Arbitrage is only possible
if an educational user can alter the software to add or restore the missing features at a cost
less than the discriminatory price differential.147
New digital distribution technologies promise to limit arbitrage opportunities for
digital works. Many transactions involving copyrighted works are being converted from
sales of goods to sales of services. Text published in encyclopedias or legal digests can be
resold, but a subscription to a database cannot.148 Videotapes can be resold but video that
is delivered over the Internet by streaming technology cannot.149 On the other hand, the
transaction costs that block arbitrage will fall as digital commerce appears.
The possibility of contract or copyright lawsuits raises the barrier to arbitrage of
copyrighted works. The link between the first sale doctrine and arbitrage is obvious. If
favored buyers can purchase a work and then sell or lease it to disfavored buyers then
145
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price discrimination may be defeated. Contract restrictions on resale or other transfers
deter arbitrage.
Contract terms can impede arbitrage in other ways. In ProCD a field of use
restriction in the software contract did the job.150 Customers were sorted into the
commercial and consumer categories and charged different prices. The favored consumer
buyers were discouraged from making commercial use of the database by the threat of
contract litigation.151 The tying contract in IBM was designed to prevented high valuation
customers from buying low cost punch cards in the open market. Contracts often limit
the modification of software or the movement (migration) of software from one platform
to another. One purpose of this limitation is to reduce arbitrage possibilities.152 For
example, an application program like a statistics package can be designed to run on a DOS
or UNIX operating system. The UNIX buyers tend to have more powerful machines and
higher valuations for the software. If the price charged for UNIX versions is higher, then
UNIX buyers may want to purchase a DOS version and modify it to run on UNIX. This
arbitrage can be deterred if the price differential is less than the cost of modification. But
the seller might want a larger price differential which makes the contract limitation
valuable.
III. COPYRIGHT LAW, DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND PROFIT
The argument for expansion of copyright protection of digital works that I
presented is premised on the assumption that developments in digital technology will
erode profits to copyright holders. The premise is probably false. Digital technology will
encourage more price discrimination153 and greater profits to copyright holders regardless
of the direction of copyright law in the digital world. Digital technology is also likely to
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create new markets and new profit opportunities for authors and publishers.154 In
contrast, the growth of unauthorized sharing and piracy can be mitigated by copy
prevention and copy tracking technology. 155 Furthermore, the losses from unauthorized
sharing of digital works and the probability that the practice will grow are likely
overstated. 156 Finally, it is important to realize that the most significant economic effect
of expanded copyright protection of digital works will be to facilitate even more price
discrimination. The ostensible goal may be to restore lost profits, but the result is likely
to be a vast gain in profits by copyright holders.
A. Price Discrimination and Profit
Copyright expansion and digital technology will create a windfall of profit for
copyright holders. Both make arbitrage harder and preference measurement easier which
facilitates more price discrimination. More price discrimination means more profit to the
sellers of digital works.
Price discrimination is a potent method of increasing a seller’s profit, because the
seller can squeeze more revenue out of existing customers.157 Consider an example.
Assume that there are two types of buyers in the market for a particular novel. Type H
has a high valuation of $20 for the novel, and type L has a low valuation of $10. There are
two million type H buyers and six million type L buyers. Assume that the marginal cost
of printing and distributing the novel is $5. The uniform monopoly price for the novel is
$10 which yields a profit of $40 million.158 A price discriminating monopolist would
charge $20 to the H types and $10 to the L types which yields a profit of $60 million.159
Thus profit rises by 50%.
A second example is illustrated in Figure 1. It shows a smooth downward sloping
demand curve. Unlike the first example, buyers’ valuations take on a continuum of values.
Again I assume that the marginal cost (given by the line XY) of a novel is $5. The uniform
monopoly price is shown as M. The profit is the area of the rectangle VWXM. Next
suppose that first degree price discrimination is possible so that the monopolist can
identify the maximum willingness to pay of every user. The monopolist charges a
different price to every user corresponding to their position on the demand curve. The
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monopolist serves every consumer up to the one with a valuation of $5. The profit is the
area of the triangle XYZ. Price discrimination doubles the profit of the seller.
Price
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.
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.
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Y

Quantity

Figure 1
Digital technology will directly facilitate price discrimination by allowing low cost
metering of the usage of digital works.160 Technology for metering a customer’s usage of a
product occurs outside of the digital realm. Photocopy machines are equipped with
counters that record the number of copies made. This information is useful for
maintenance, but it also can be used to determine charges under a lease agreement.
Similarly, the odometer in a rental car record mileage information that is useful for
maintenance and linked to rental charges. Within the digital realm, probably every reader
of this Article is familiar with legal research databases. The database providers record
information on how much time each user spends on-line and how many pages of text each
user downloads. This information is useful managing access to the database and
determining its contents, but it also can be used to determine charges.
In the future, methods like streaming of audio and video or cryptographic
envelopes will make usage metering widespread.161 Metering systems will allow
copyright holders to charge for every access to and use of their work.162 Goldstein
speculates that because new transmission technology will be able to “keep a record of
every selection a subscriber makes, and the price he paid for it, copyright owners will
have a far more precise measure of the demand for their products than they do today.” 163
160
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Improvements in measuring usage allow better measurement of user valuations and lead to
more profitable price discrimination.
Some more good news for copyright holders is that arbitrage can be discouraged
with copy prevention technology. Currently, music producers use CD-ROMs to
distribute music because it is difficult for the typical user to make digital copies from
them. Electronic game manufacturers sell game cartridges that are difficult to copy. Soon
other techniques will be available to impede personal digital copying.164 Regardless of
whether they price discriminate, copyright holders will try to stop personal copying that
leads to unauthorized sharing. Sellers charging a uniform price want to get every user to
pay that price. But price discriminators especially dislike sharing because it is an avenue
for arbitrage. More price discrimination will now be feasible because copy prevention
methods can discourage sharing and arbitrage.
Returning now to copyright law, I have shown in Section II that expanded legal
protection of digital works will ease measurement of preferences and discourage arbitrage.
To summarize the impact on preference measurement: field of use restrictions in
copyright licenses segregate buyers by type; and software site licenses allow the counting
of users. An impact on arbitrage arises because: restriction of the first sale doctrine means
less sharing and fewer arbitrage opportunities; a diminished fair use doctrine means that
users may not be able to decompile, modify, or migrate software in such a way as to
defeat second degree price discrimination; contract terms may abrogate the personal use
rights that remain and thereby discourage sharing; and prohibition of technology that
circumvents copy prevention lessens opportunities for sharing and arbitrage.
Would-be price discriminators are delighted by the prospect of shrinking personal
use rights combined with digital metering technology. These two developments have a
complementary effect. To see why suppose that some genre of work X is distributed via
some new technology A. It might be the case that technology A allows for easy metering
of use of X, but does nothing to discourage arbitrage. Price discrimination might be
enabled because changes in copyright law cutting back on personal use rights help the
seller block arbitrage. Better measurement is worthless to a price discriminator who
cannot stop arbitrage. Similarly, there is no reason to price discriminate or try to block
arbitrage if one cannot measure user valuations. Both technology and expansion of
copyright could induce new or more elaborate price discrimination on their own, but
together they should lead to much more.
B. Unauthorized Sharing and Profit
Proponents of copyright expansion fear that personal use rights in the digital age
will lead to rampant small-scale, informal sharing and copying that will devastate
164
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publishers. 165 There are three reasons why I doubt that fear will be realized. First, the loss
in profits from personal use is probably exaggerated. Second, digital technology will not
necessarily increase the exercise of personal use rights. Third, technical measures are also
available to restrict exercise of those rights.
Personal use rights limit the distribution rights of a copyright holder. This irritates
publishers who would like to have complete control over distribution channels.166 They
complain that personal copying, lending, and sharing cuts into sales and revenue. This
seems like an obvious grievance but it is actually quite complicated. Part of the complaint
holds that personal use cuts sales -- that is probably true. Part of the complaint holds
that personal use cuts revenue -- that is also probably true, but it is less clear and less
dramatic than people usually think. An unspoken part of the complaint is that personal
use cuts distribution cost -- unspoken, because it is a benefit to publishers.
Personal use cuts sales because a user does not make a commercial purchase if
they get software, music or video from a friend. The sales decline might be offset by
favorable word-of-mouth advertising associated with personal use that increases demand.
The sales decline is limited because many of the users who could not get the work from a
friend would simply drop out of the market.167 Personal use cuts revenue because sales
fall. This cut in revenue might be completely offset by a higher sales price. If a
copyrighted work would sell for $5 per copy in a world with no sharing, it might sell for
$10 in a world in which every purchaser shares the work with one other person. The total
sales revenue is the same.168 Of course, the price is not apt to rise to $10 if the purchaser
does not charge her friend and does not fully value her friend’s use.169 Finally, personal
use cuts distribution costs, because the purchaser bears the cost of distributing a copy to
her friend and the publisher avoids this cost. The net effect on the profit of publishers is
undoubtedly negative, but the size of the effect is overstated by the emphasis on sales
rather than revenue and cost.170 Further, this is just as much a problem for hard copy and
analogue publishers as it is for digital publishers.
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It is easy to see that the Internet raises the threat of piracy, but it is not so easy to
see that personal use rights will be exercised more frequently in a digital world. Given the
current state of technology, borrowing or sharing a hard copy newspaper or magazine or
novel is more likely than borrowing or sharing the digital equivalent.171 On the other hand,
clipping digital articles and sending them via e-mail is easier than clipping a newspaper or
magazine. As video on demand becomes available it will probably displace personal
copying to time-shift TV programming and trips to the video store. On the other hand,
patrons of a digital library will probably do more personal copying, and the library will
probably avoid purchase of duplicate copies of digital works.
Regardless of people’s desire to copy different kinds of media, publishers can
control copying of digital works using technical measures that have no counterpart for
hardcopy works and few counterparts for analogue works.172 Publishers might either
prevent copying or make unauthorized copies of digital works unusable.173 Movie and
music producers have worked in concert with consumer electronics manufacturers to
make it impossible for ordinary consumers to make useful copies of digital movies or
serial copies of digital music.174 Software and digital text publishers also have techniques
to stop personal copying, although they are less effective.
When videotape machines began to appear in homes the first response by movie
producers was to sue Sony and other manufacturers for contributory infringement. Their
hope was that equipment manufacturers would be forced to pay copyright royalties to cover
the cost of personal copying and sharing. When litigation failed the producers turned to
technology. The sharing of videotape has been effectively controlled by stopping VCR
owners from taping movies using two VCRs, sometimes called back-to-back recording.175 A
process called Macrovision protects analog video by embedding a signal onto videotapes
that interferes with copying.176 Movie producers secured the cooperation of VCR producers
who agreed to design and only sell VCRs that implement the Macrovision process.
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Macrovision set a precedent for inter-industry cooperation that has been followed
for the new Digital Versatile Discs (DVD) technology.177 Any digital work can be
distributed via DVD, including video, music, text, and any combination of the three.178 Since
DVD movies are stored as digital works, the danger of copying is arguably greater than the
danger of copying for analog VHS tapes. DVD units that allow recording could easily
become home video production factories. As a result, Hollywood studios have demanded
strong copy prevention technology before agreeing to release movies to DVD.179 To protect
the content on DVD discs from digital-to-digital copying, the content of DVD discs will be
encrypted so that the contents cannot be easily copied directly on to another digital
medium.180 Chips in the DVD players will decode the encrypted contents and allow
playback.181 Later DVD decks with recording capabilities will also be equipped with a
special anti-copying chip.182 If a user tries to record a DVD movie on one of these decks, the
anti-copying chip in the deck will detect the encrypted signal embedded in the movie and
will shut down.183 The DVD standards also guard against copies from DVD to videotape.184
Distribution of video and audio over the Internet instead of by DVD presents new
problems for copyright owners. In essence, the Internet has the potential to detach digital
works from the physical media which have traditionally been used to distribute digital
works. With the Internet, a digital work is simply copied into memory or onto disk and
then played by the user’s computer. Copyright owners fear that they will lose revenue if
users are able to make copies of digital works and store them on their home computers for
later retrieval, reuse, and/or further copying and distribution without the payment of
additional revenue to the copyright holder. On the other hand, copyright owners realize
that dispensing with physical media as the primary distribution system for digital works
would result in enormous cost savings since the costs of production, shipping and storage
would be eliminated if these works were distributed over the Internet.
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One solution is to take advantage of specific distribution protocols which
incorporate means of protecting against copying. An example is streaming audio and video.
Streaming audio and video are relatively new to the Internet.185 Before streaming audio
and video was invented, a user who wanted to listen to an audio clip or to view a film clip
often had to wait a long time for the entire clip to download to her computer before she
could play the clip.186 Once the file was downloaded, she typically had a copy of the file
accessible on her system which she could redistribute to other users. By moving to
streaming audio and video copyright owners have been able to solve two problems at
once. Instead of waiting for the entire file to download, streaming audio and video request
the work from the remote server, buffer a portion of the file, and then begin to play the
buffered portion while still receiving the rest of the file from the remote server.187 For the
user this means less wait time since a large portion of the downloading can be
accomplished while the user is already watching the clip.188
The implications of streaming audio and video for copyright protection are equally
impressive. Companies currently developing streaming audio and video applications
typically distribute free copies of the software required to listen to or view the audio or
video stream.189 The free player software typically does not include a record option.190 If
a user wants to be able to record streaming audio or video she must pay for the full
version of the software. 191 Even if she purchases the full version, however, a copyright
owner has the final say over which portions of a work she can copy.192 This selective
recording allows a copyright owner to determine on his server whether or not the user can
use the player software on her own computer to copy the audio or video.193 Thus a
copyright owner can ensure that the work is used or enjoyed only once per purchase.
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Software publishers have tried several copy prevention strategies. In the early
1980s, the computer software industry relied almost exclusively on the copy prevention
strategy in attempts to protect software from unauthorized copying. Often copy prevention
simply relied on computer disks holding a program that could not be copied without special
software.194 In an era when hard drives were in their infancy, this strategy made sense. For
users without hard drives, possession of the original physical media was necessary to use
the program at all. Even users who had hard drives were prevented from making additional
copies of the program disks,195 although they could potentially perform multiple
installations of the same program. To prevent the practice of sharing software many
manufacturers not only made the program disks uncopyable, they also required the user
to have the original disk in their computer’s disk drive before they could run the program
from their hard drive.196
The problem with preventing copying of the physical media was twofold. First,
users found the copy protection annoying.197 Copy protection prevented legitimate copying
of the software for archival and backup purposes.198 If anything happened to the original
disks, or if the media itself failed, users were unable to rely on backup copies of the software
they had purchased.199 Resentment in the marketplace was so strong that organizations
started boycotting software that used these types of copy prevention.200 These marketplace
revolts against early copy protection were a prime cause of its abandonment by most
software manufacturers by the end of the 1980s.201 A second reason copy protection on
194
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physical media was largely abandoned was the fact that the copy protection was often
easily circumvented.202 The release of new copy protected program was typically followed
by the immediate release of a new “cracking” program capable of defeating the copy
protection on the new program.203 Software manufacturers and cracking software
manufacturers engaged in a type of arms race over copy protection that ultimately made
copy protection on the physical media largely ineffective.204
A more robust copy protection system was adopted by manufacturers of high-end
software applications such as CAD software.205 Instead of relying on software-based copy
protection these manufacturers chose to use a hardware-based copy protection.
Hardware-based copy protection used physical keys which were required to unlock
software applications.206 These keys, commonly known as dongles, had to be attached to a
port on the users computer in order for a particular software application to operate.207
During operation the software checks for the presence of the dongle and stops operating if
the dongle is not detected.208 Hardware-based copy protection was designed to deter all
but the most determined pirates. A potential pirate would have to duplicate both the
software and the hardware key in order to use unauthorized copies of the application
software protected by the key. 209 Despite the apparent strengths of hardware-based
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copy protection, its use today remains confined to high-end applications such as
networking software.210
Software copy prevention in the future probably will not depend on hardware and
physical media. Software performs on general purpose computers unlike digital music and
video which are played on dedicated machines. Software publishers and computer
manufacturers are more numerous and heterogeneous than their counterparts in the movie
and music industries. This makes the prospect of coordinating an inter-industry copy
prevention strategy unlikely.211 The likely path of copy prevention is encryption and other
methods based solely on software code.212
C. Piracy and Profit
Piracy is not a problem that is new to digital technology. For my purposes the
relevant question is whether digital technology aggravates the problem of piracy, and
thereby diminishes profits to copyright holders. Copyright holders argue that pirates will
benefit from the ability to make cheaper and higher quality copies and from more efficient
distribution via the Internet. The predicted result according to copyright holders will be
more acts of piracy. They also worry that non-traditional pirates who are not profitmotivated will become a significant factor.
Ultimately, modest changes to copyright law are probably sufficient to contain
the problem of digital piracy.213 Greatly expanded copyright protection is not required
because publishers have a variety of self-help measures available.214 The first possibility
is to avoid digital publication.215 For example, publishers might not distribute digital
protection was prohibitively expense for use with consumer software programs. See Linzmayer, supra note
206. Second, some users reacted negatively to the possibility of having to connect multiple dongles to
their systems in order to run more than one dongle protected program. See e.g. Jerry Pournelle, Computing
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copies of novels and photographs. For many types of work this will not be satisfactory
though, because consumers will demand digital works. Furthermore, digital copies can be
made from non-digital works. Nonetheless, consumers might not be willing to buy a
pirated digital novel or collection of photographs because they cannot easily turn the
digital file into a book or high quality print.216 In addition, the copyright holder would
know that any digital copy of the work is unauthorized.
Second, there are many technologies for preventing the copying of digital
works. Anti-copying technology is built into the new DVD systems, certain CAD
systems, and streaming of audio and video over the Internet.218 Such technological barriers
might not stop sophisticated and determined pirates, but they are apt to be effective against
marginal pirates like disgruntled employees and pranksters.219 In the past sophisticated
pirates have been skilled at inventing around copy-prevention technology. Nevertheless
copy prevention is apt to give the authorized publisher at least a substantial lead time
advantage over unauthorized competitors.220 In the future copy prevention methods that
rely chiefly on encryption might be even more successful in limiting piracy.221 Professor
Netanel contends: “Digital content providers enjoy an unprecedented capacity, through a
combination of contract, digital encryption, and electronic monitoring, to prevent
unauthorized access to and uses of expression and information stored in computer
databases.”222
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The third and most effective response to piracy is diligent enforcement of existing
rights. Enforcement depends on a method to detect unauthorized copies. Copyright
holders can easily recognize the quality differences between bootleg copies and legitimate
copies of analogue audiotape or videotape. Since a pirate can reproduce digital works
precisely, copyright holders need a way to distinguish bootleg digital copies.
Unauthorized copies can be distinguished by examining the copy tracking information
embedded in each copy.223 Digital watermarking,224 digital fingerprinting,225 and copyright
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management systems226 are all examples of tracking systems. While the details of each of
these systems vary, the underlying principle is generally the same. Each work protected by
these methods is modified to include information that typically identifies the copyright
owner and the buyer of the work.227 As a licensee of the work, the buyer may or may not be
licensed to make copies of the work. If she makes unauthorized copies of the work and
distributes them to others, the identifying information embedded in the work gives away the
source of the unauthorized copies and exposes her to liability.228 The tracking information
can make virtually irrefutable evidence of unauthorized copying and make detection of
copyright infringement and identification of infringers much easier.229
The newer and more sophisticated copy tracking systems also offer a form of copy
protection. The systems rely on powerful encryption to both protect data from copying
and to ensure that unauthorized copying can be traced to its source.230 One prototype, the
Electronic Copyright Management System (ECMS), will encode the work itself in a
cryptographic envelope, or cryptolope for short.231 At the same time, a plain text index
section will be created so that the content can be searched for and identified without
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opening the cryptolope.232 A user will be able to examine the index information without
paying for the content, but will have to pay for a cryptographic key if they want to see the
content itself.233 The key will open the cryptolope and allow various uses depending on the
terms of the license and the amount paid. For example, it would cost more to be able to
view a work 100 times than it would to be able to view a work only once.
The ability of users to tamper with copy tracking information creates a possible
limitation to the copy tracking strategy. If history is any guide, the producers of digital
works may again find themselves faced with crackers who specialize in removing copy
tracking information from digital works. Encryption techniques are one way a copyright
owner can prevent tampering.234 In addition, producers of digital works support the White
Paper’s provisions criminalizing the production and distribution of technology that is
designed to remove or modify copy tracking information from digital works.235
Besides the ease of copying digital works publishers point to the Internet as another
factor promoting piracy. Internet distribution does not create intractable enforcement
problems. Digital publishers complain about the shear number of possible pirates and the
costs of litigation. Large publishers like Microsoft should be able to find the resources to
vigorously enforce their copyrights against pirates. The example of Coca-Cola enforcing its
trademark rights in thousands of restaurants and bars across the country demonstrates that a
massive program of enforcement of intellectual property rights is feasible.236 Smaller
software publishers can rely to some extent on the effort of their trade association: the
Software Publishers Association (SPA).237 The SPA now polices corporate software
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licensees and enforces license agreements through legal action on behalf of individual
software publishers.238 Publishers can also rely on new methods for locating acts of piracy.
Streaming audio and video encoders are currently capable of embedding copyright
information in works distributed via streaming audio and video.239 Copyright tracking
systems are especially effective when combined with search services that locate files on the
Internet that contain identifying marks.240 As computers become increasingly networked,
the creation of a copy tracking system that can “phone home” when an unauthorized
copy is made becomes more feasible.241 Finally, when a publisher locates a source
distributing unauthorized copies of a digital work it can go after the source, and also after
the Internet service provider if the provider does not act to stop infringing transmissions
once given notice.242
CONCLUSION
Copyright tradition often differentiates private from non-private copying.243 It
gives narrower protection to the copyright holder against private copying because private
actions rarely threaten the productive incentives of authors and publishers.244 Copyright
holders argue that digital technology promotes widespread small scale copying and makes
everyone a potential copyright pirate because digital material can be cheaply and
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precisely copied and distributed.245 Thus they argue the reach of copyright protection in
the digital age should be the same for all members of the public and all types of
copying.246
A key premise supporting the call for copyright expansion is that without legal
changes the profitability of authorship and publishing will decline. I have argued that the
premise fails. Although some aspects of digital technology make unauthorized sharing and
piracy easier others make it more difficult. A narrow reform prohibiting tampering with
copyright management information is probably the only legal change needed to ward off
increased piracy. Sellers who charge uniform prices might see some kinds of sharing grow
and other kinds decline. The overall economic impact should not be large. Sellers who
price discriminate are more likely to see buyers organize to share digital works in ways
that arbitrage against price differentials.
Technology and modest changes in the law can preserve the dominant position of
the copyright holder in the distribution of the copyrighted work, and that should maintain
the requisite incentive to produce the work in the first place. Copyright expansion that is
aimed at curtailing personal copying is not really necessary to preserve productive
incentives to copyright holders. Even if my judgment is wrong it is better to err on the
side of users; if serious incentive problems appear they can be dealt with later.247 It is
much harder to take a concession away from industry than it is to add a burden to
users.248 Furthermore, ameliorative action should be media or technology specific instead
of across the board. Finally, there is a policy option that does not facilitate price
discrimination: a sales tax.249 The music industry and consumer electronics manufacturers
reached a legislative compromise concerning the treatment of Digital Audio Tape (DAT).250
Music producers were concerned that too much sharing would result from DAT technology
which allows consumers to make cheap digital copies of recorded music. The Audio Home
Recording Act absolves the equipment manufacturers of copyright liability, but a tax is
imposed on the sale of DAT players and blank DAT tapes. The proceeds of the tax are
distributed to sound recording copyright holders.
245
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Moving beyond the questions of unauthorized sharing and piracy, I show that
digital technology alone, and especially when augmented by expanded copyright
protection will facilitate price discrimination. Four of the six proposals for expanded
protection of digital works promote price discrimination. Constriction of the first sale and
fair use doctrines, contractual displacement of those doctrines, and a law prohibiting
technology designed to circumvent copy prevention methods all impede arbitrage. Indirect
liability on Internet service providers will not have a clear effect on price discrimination
unless the threat of liability leads service providers to cooperate with copyright holders in
implementing price discrimination. Finally, a law against tampering with copyright
management information does not have a direct effect on price discrimination.251
I conclude by noting that there are as many questions about the wisdom of
expanding copyright that I have not raised as I have. Proponents of expansion might argue
that copyright holders should get more profit. The basis for this argument could either be
that current incentives for production and distribution are too small, or the politically
popular Mercantilist view that high-tech, export-oriented industries should be
subsidized.252 Another argument is that broad property rights encourage valuable efforts
by copyright holders to further develop the value of their intellectual property.253 Various
critics of copyright expansion argue that personal use rights support free political speech,
journalism, education, and scientific and scholarly research.254 They might argue that the
incentives to gain a copyright are too large, and that broader dissemination of copyrighted
works is economically optimal.255 Further, they might argue that broader property rights
to copyright holders amounts to an unfair wealth transfer.256
A final issue that I have touched on tangentially is the broad normative impact of
price discrimination.257 Proponents of copyright expansion can argue that price
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discrimination is economically efficient.258 Critics can make counterarguments about
efficiency and point to distributional problems.259
The simplest and strongest observation about price discrimination is that it
increases profit to the seller -- else the seller would refrain from discrimination.
Surprisingly, the gains of the seller do not always come at the expense of the buyers. It
may happen that discrimination increases the amount of surplus generated by a
transaction, leaving consumer welfare unaffected or even improved.260 This rosy scenario
follows from the assumption that a uniform monopoly price would be so high that the
low valuation segment of buyers is driven out of the market. If that assumption is correct
then allowing discrimination brings new buyers into the market. In the standard model,
the high valuation consumers are unaffected by discrimination since they continue to pay
the original uniform monopoly price, only the low valuation consumers benefit from the
new discount price.261
Reversing the assumption about who buys under a uniform monopoly price leads
to a gloomier price discrimination scenario. If both high and low valuation buyers make
purchases given a uniform monopoly price, then discrimination does not increase output
and does not create direct efficiency gains. The high valuation buyers will lose surplus
because they face a higher price, while the low valuation buyers are unaffected by
discrimination because they continue to face the old uniform monopoly price.
Adding more realism quickly makes models of price discrimination difficult to
analyze. But economists do make some general claims consistent with the preceding two
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examples.262 First, the seller gains. Second, the low valuation consumers are indifferent or
benefit. Third, the high valuation consumers are indifferent or suffer.263 Fourth, price
discrimination can increase or decrease equilibrium output.264 Fifth, an increase in output
is not sufficient to guarantee that total surplus increases.265 In addition to the
consumption side of the market, price discrimination is also felt indirectly on the
production side of the market. Inefficiency arises from the costs of measuring different
customers’ valuations, of writing and enforcing contracts that prevent arbitrage, and of
designing different types of products or distribution systems.266

262

See Tirole, supra note 126 at 137-139. The welfare effects of third degree price discrimination are: (1)
quantity increase is a necessary not sufficient condition for a welfare increase, because discrimination leads
to unequal marginal rates of substitution across consumers; (2) profits rises; and (3) the high elasticity
customers benefit (and they are more likely to be poor). Id.
263
If there are more than two categories of buyers, those with higher valuations (or more precisely lower
elasticity) tend to lose and those with lower valuations (higher elasticity) tend to gain.
264
An example will demonstrate that possibility. Suppose three low valuation buyers each want one unit of
some good and assign a value of 2 to the good. Suppose a single high valuation buyer assigns a value of 5
to the first unit of the good and a value of 2 to the second unit. Under uniform monopoly pricing the profit
maximizing price is 2, output is 5, and revenue is 10. Under price discrimination the low valuation buyers
are charged 2, the high valuation buyer is charged 5, output is 4, and revenue is 11.
265
Many lawyers using economic analysis seem to think that output increases are sure to create surplus
increases. That linkage does not hold in general. With regard to price discrimination the positive efficiency
effect from an increase in output may be offset by a negative efficiency caused by differences in the marginal
rates of substitution between favored and disfavored buyers. See Viscusi, et al., supra note of 263 at 279283 (Discrimination causes inefficiency because it makes the marginal rates of substitution differ across
buyers. Disfavored buyers have a higher marginal valuation than favored buyers. If the marginal unit of
output is taken from a favored buyer and given to a disfavored buyer then total surplus rises.)
266
See generally, Hovenkamp, supra note 132 at 345.

44

